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The OED distinguishes two principal senses of the word “conversation”: “the action of living or
having one’s being in a place or among persons”, and “interchange of words, thoughts”. The first
(indicating a kind of habitus, frequently with moral inflection) presumes more about a conversant
than the second. Hence in Pericles Gower speaks of the hero as “the good in conversation”. While
there is some overlap, there is a significant gap in meaning and a kind of cultural struggle waged
between the two. In the early modern period the first sense (deriving from Augustine and the
Theatrum Mundi) might be thought of as dominant and the second emergent.  Both were the
focus  of  theoretical  elaboration:  the  first  principally  by  puritans  (resulting  in  a  register  of
“Christian conversation”), the second in two principle ways, by Steffano Guazzo and Montaigne.
Guazzo’s  Civile  Conversation  (tr.1581, 1586) begins by conceding its  profanity  in Augustinian
terms, but then proceeds to redefine the word in a secular,  pragmatic and essentially modern
sense.  Montaigne’s  understanding  of  conversation  is  informed  by  Guazzo’s  but  adds  a
sophisticated  understanding  of  conversation  as  dialectic.  What  I  propose  is  to  sketch  these
various meanings of the word “conversation”, speak to the “turn” from one end of its spectrum of
meanings  to  the  other,  and  then  identify  this  spectrum  of  meanings  in  Shakespeare.  That
Shakespeare understands conversation in its pragmatic sense should come as no surprise,  but
that he should systematically understand it in the sense of a moral habitus while also exploring it
in the sense of dialectic should surprise.
L'Oxford English Dictionary distingue entre deux sens principaux du terme conversation. D’une
part, la conversation est définie comme l’action de vivre avec ou de se tenir en un lieu, ou parmi
d’autres personnes. De l’autre, elle correspond à un échange de paroles ou d’idées. La première
définition,  qui  relève  d’une  sorte  d’habitus,  et  qui  est  généralement  coloré  d’un  sens  moral,
présuppose bien plus de la part de la personne qui converse. Ainsi, dans Pericles de Shakespeare,
Gower parle du héros de la pièce comme du « good in conversation », voulant dire par là qu’il se
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conduit  ou  qu’il  «  converse  »  honnêtement.  Bien  qu’ils  se  recoupent  en  partie,  il  subsiste
néanmoins  un  écart,  voire  une  forme  de  tension  ou  d’affrontement  culturel,  entre  les  deux
acceptions de la conversation. Le premier sens, dérivé de saint Augustin et  de la tradition du
Theatrum Mundi, était le sens principal durant la première modernité ; le second sens, courant
aujourd’hui, n’était alors que naissant. L’un et l’autre faisaient l’objet d’une réflexion théorique :
les puritains s’était emparé du premier sens (décliné sous la forme plus précise de « conversation
chrétienne »),  le second était  exploré notamment par Steffano Guazzo et Montaigne. Dans sa
Civile Conversation (traduite en anglais en 1581 et 1586), Guazzo commence par reconnaître le
caractère profane de sa conversation en des termes qui restent augustiniens, avant de redéfinir la
notion en des termes pleinement laïques, et pragmatiques, c’est-à-dire modernes. La définition
qu’en  donne  Montaigne reste  informée par la  pensée de Guazzo mais  vient  s’y  ajouter  l’idée
sophistiquée  d’une  conversation  qui  serait  dialectique.  Le  présent  article  se  propose  de
développer, dans un premier temps, chacune de ces définitions de la conversation pour mieux
mettre en lumière l’évolution de la notion et son tournant vers le sens moderne, avant de voir
comment Shakespeare la décline. On ne sera pas étonné de voir que Shakespeare envisage la
conversation en des termes assez neutres et pragmatiques, mais ce qui surprend davantage c’est
qu’il l’envisage systématiquement, dans le même temps, comme un habitus et une dialectique.
Index terms
Mots-clés : Conversation, chrétien, sacré, Shakespeare, sensus communis
Keywords : conversation, Christian, holy, William Shakespeare, sensus communis
Full text
The first six senses of the OED definition of “conversation” will strike us as foreign to
its current meaning: namely, “interchange of thoughts and words, familiar discourse or
talk”.1  The date of  this  now intuitive sense (OED:7a) is  given as 1586..  The first  six
senses reach back centuries earlier. Sense 1 defines conversation as, “the action of living
or having one’s being in a place or among  persons. Also fig. of one’s spiritual being”
(1340). All senses up to 7a belong to the same family of meanings. Thus sense 2 is: “the
action  of  consorting  or  having  dealings  with  others;  living  together;  commerce,
intercourse,  society,  intimacy”  (c.  1340).  The  earlier  family  of  meanings  is  different
enough to  warrant  a  distinctive  concept  along  the lines  of  Bourdieu’s  notion of  the
habitus.  Thus,  whereas  “the  action  of  consorting”  is  understood  as  significantly
constituting social identity, the habitus denotes a distinctive sub-set of the social world
(such as locality or class) that, ”functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions,
appreciations and actions”, and to which social identity is attuned.2 The earlier sense of
“conversation”  thus  suggests a species  of  habitus  linking  consortment  with  identity.
Accordingly in King Lear Kent professes, “to converse with him that is wise and says
little”  (1.4.15):  the  quality  of  the  conversation  being  inversely  proportional  to  its
wordiness. In Pericles, the identity testified to by one’s conversation is moral or even
spiritual.  Thus the hero is  described as  “the good in conversation” (5.9)  against  the
incestuous Antiochus.3 But “sexual intercourse or intimacy” (OED, sense 3.a) – typically
in an impure sense – can also be denoted, as in, “Hastings’ conversation with Shore’s
wife” (3.5.30) in Richard III. Eventually this sub-sense of the word, with its implication
of  “apparent  open  guilt”  (3.5.29),  would  evolve  into  the  legal  action  of  “criminal
conversation” for the prosecution of adultery.  All  such conversation carries a fearful
presumption of immersiveness. Fearful, because if the immersing milieu is tainted, then
the self is necessarily subdued to that taint. Shakespeare voices this fear in Sonnet 111
when lamenting the “public manners” picked up by the “public means” (4) by which he
has been obliged to earn his living: “Thence comes it that my name receives a brand, /
And almost thence my nature is subdued / To what it works in, like the dyer’s hand”
1
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Civile Conversation
I say first, that to climbe to the true service of God […] the desartes, al by places
and solitarie, are the right ladders. And contrariwise, companies are nought els but
hookes and tonges, which withdrawing us by force out of the course of our good
thoughtes, set us in the way of distruction: for that this life being full of suspitions,
deceits, lasciviousnesse, perjuries, detractions, envy, oppressions, violences […] a
man can not turne his eyes aside, but that he shalbe forced to beholde some evil
thing or other, which entereth and insinuateth it selfe by a broade way unto the
heart [...]. (S. Guazzo, op. cit., p. 24)
(5-7).4 Both senses of “conversation” are implied: if the central image is that of vulgarity
imbibed from conversation as habitus, the sonnet itself conducts a “familiar discourse”
with the friend who has presumably upbraided the poet with his commonness.
While  there  is  evidently  a  continuity  between  the  earlier  and  the  later  senses  of
“conversation” there is also a gap that was to open up in following centuries to the point
where the earlier sense would recede, leaving phantom traces (such as the quite recently
obsolete statute regarding “criminal conversation”). In what follows I want to explore
what is behind the shift of one sense to another, a shift which is coeval with the career of
Shakespeare. In the wake of Lukács, one is tempted to say that the shift is connected
with the change from a feudal society (in which identity is largely fixed) to a capitalist
society (in which identity is more mobile).5 Attractive though this thought is however, I
prefer to operate at a more granular level. This must involve two related tasks.
2
The first is to explore early modern theoretical discussions of “conversation”. While
the OED can tell us that a shift took place, it cannot tell us how or why. For that we must
have recourse to a range of early modern thinking on the topic. I will outline what I take
to be three distinct species of conversational theory in Shakespeare’s period: civil, holy
and dialectical. The first corresponds to Stefano Guazzo’s Civile Conversation  (trans.
1581, 1586); the second to the puritan ideal and practice of a distinctly Christian way of
conversing; the third arising from Montaigne’s essay Sur l’art de conférer. Each theory
is  conscious  of  its  rivals,  depicting  them  with  a  distinctive  slant.  None  is  entirely
reducible either to the earlier or to the later sense of the word “conversation”. Each is
cognizant of the turn in meaning if to different degrees. The initial aim of this paper is
then to sketch out each of these three theories to a level of detail in keeping with article
length.  The second aim is  to explore  how the three  conversational  theories  track in
Shakespeare. We shall see that these early modern discussions have a strong ethical or
indeed  theological  tinge,  and  it  is  in  this  spectrum  of  their  meaning  that  the  true
moment of the shift or turn is grasped. In addition to my archaeological and critical
projects, I wish to think more broadly of the significance of Shakespeare’s achievement,
given  both  the  enormity  of  the  leap  into  the  philosophical  future  taken  by
“conversation” at  this  moment,  and the profound contribution to that leap made by
Shakespeare’s great contemporary, Montaigne.
3
We can begin discussion of the conversational turn with a work written on its cusp:
Stefano Guazzo’s Civile Conversation.6 Guazzo is already conscious of a notion that is
mobile, that can no longer be taken for granted. The book takes the form of a dialogue
between  “Young  Guazzo”  a  proponent  of  conversation  in  the  earlier  (and  morally
anxious)  sense,  and  “Annibale”  a  proponent  of  conversation  in  an  open  and  more
modern sense. The first 30 pages or so are dominated by Young Guazzo’s reluctance to
converse  at  all  in  the  sense  of  venturing  beyond  a  state  of  hermetic  solitude  and
engaging in the profane conversation of “companies”:
4
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How can I live without thee, how forgoe
Thy sweet Converse and Love so dearly joyn’d,
To live in these wilde Woods forlorn?
Should God create another Eve and I
Another rib afford, yet loss of thee
Would never from my heart; no, no, I feel
The Link of Nature draw me.8
The poore soule always liveth with an unquiet mind, and his maister doth
continually loade him like a good horse […] and never leaveth until hee have quite
tyred him […]. Whereupon I thinke not amisse to followe the fable of the earthen
vessel, whiche in no wise woulde have the company of the brazen vessel. And you
know wel, that in their companie a man cannot utter his minde freely nor doe any
thing contrarie to their pleasure: if hee does, hee shalbe no friend of Caesars.
(209-10)
While Young Guazzo’s aversion to conversation is driven partly by melancholy7,  his
justification is both moral and Augustinian. “Our first father”,  he continues, “was as
hapie while hee lived in solitarinesse, as hee was after miserable and griefefull when hee
was  in  company”  (ibid.,  p.  25).  A  similar  logic  governs  Milton’s  depiction  of  Adam
falling through an addiction to Eve’s conversation:
5
C. S.  Lewis  contextualizes  “sweet  Converse”  with Augustine’s  gloss  on the Fall  as
representing a turn to socialis necessitudo (or the social bond constituted in Adam and
Eve by virtue of their being “a married pair”, which is to say a representation of human
society in embryo).9  The reason Adam’s sin is endemic, according to Augustine, is to
have initiated the split between divine and profane conversation. This is something of
which English readers of Guazzo would have been strongly conscious, for the reason
that (as we shall see) puritan conversation was an attempt to solder that split, to turn
human conversation back towards God in a consciously “Christian” direction.
6
A  prime  danger  of  conversation  for  Young  Guazzo  is  its  viral  quality:  “as  some
diseases of the body are infectious, so the vices of the mind take from one to another, so
that a drunkerd draweth his companions to like wine, a Carpet knight corrupteth and
effeminateth a valiant man: and so much force hath continual conversation, that oft
times  against  our  wils,  we  imitate  the  vices  of  others”  (44).  Vice  is  more  viral  or
transmissive than it is a native condition. Hence: “I […] perswade my selfe, that vices
should be banished out of the world, if conversation were taken out of it: seeing that
adulteries,  robberies,  violences,  blasphemies,  murthers,  and  infinite  other  evils,  are
learned  by  the  conversation  of  men”  (39).  Courtly  conversation  –  which  positively
requires  the  speaker’s  conformity  with  his  habitus  –  is  particularly  suspect.  Young
Guazzo mentions a young gentleman who was pressured to blaspheme by the bodies of
the saints (rather than swear by the body of a hen), “to the end he might be taken for a
good courtier” (59). In Book 2, Annibale (perhaps reflecting the author’s own unhappy
experience of courtiership10) will reflect on the misery of the courtier always at the beck
and call of the prince:
7
Though an “earthen” rather than a “brazen” vessel in terms of Guazzo’s metaphor,
“civile conversation” has the advantage of freedom and the potential of real integrity. It
is, “an honest, commendable and virtuous kinde of living in the worlde” (56).11 On the
one  hand it  is  moral  (“to  live  civilly,  is  not  sayde in  respect  of  the  citie  but  of  the
qualities of the minde”, p. 56) and on the other, constructively busy as distinct from the
courtier-like  mischief  of,  “conspyring  together,  and  secretly  devising  howe  to  bring
some Officer into the disfavor of his Prince” (117). “Civile conversation” is not merely a
facility for engaging the world on its own terms but potentially a watchfulness over one’s
8
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touching the respect of honestie and virtue, wee ought to bee always one and the
same […] touching the diversitie of the persons with whom wee shall be
conversaunt, we must alter ourselves into an other (my italics) […]. And he, which
shall not frame him selfe to doe this, shall be driven to curse conversation” (105).
integrity while doing so. Potentially at least, it is “honest” in the strongly moral sense of
this word rather than the weakly decorous sense, which (in the words of Andrew James
Hartley) was, “less about truth-telling […] than […] about the preservation of social and
aesthetic decorum”.12 Finally, it is for everyone, “all sortes of persons of what place, or
what calling soever they are” (56).
As Guazzo proceeds however, the moral emphasis is progressively diluted. The more
profane the conversant, the more compromising the conversation. Yet our freedom to
pick and choose our partners is constrained by pragmatism. Annibale advises that we
should be prepared to converse with pretty well anybody. To be off-limits, a conversant
must be branded with a mark like Cain. But in the inevitable absence of such a mark, all
conversants must be regarded as “tollerable” (62). They will in other words include the
very worst kinds of people: such as blasphemers and hypocrites (62, 67). Blasphemers
might commit an intolerable offence against God, but the Christian must tolerate them
because he cannot afford to make “reconing of the offences doone to Godwarde” (60).
Hence, “though as a Christian you ought to flie them, yet as a courtier, you cannot keep
you from them” (60). The Christian moreover should not flatter himself that he keeps
the company of such men in order to convert them: they are far more likely to convert
him.13 Yet to forgo the company of such people, as of gamblers, would be too “precise”
(105), a word which must not only have resonated in 1580s England, but may have had
a role in shaping the very idea of the “precisian” or puritan.
9
Annibale’s tone becomes ever more pragmatic: conversation is simply indispensable
for making one’s way in the world. Flattery eventually morphs from being an outright
evil to an indispensable skill: “Take this with you, as trueth getteth hatred, so flatterie
winneth love and breedeth good blood, insomuch that hee which would take flatterie
out of  the worlde, shoulde take away all  humanitie and courtesie” (80).  Much as in
Shakespeare’s Globe, the moral topos of the theatrum mundi is referenced (“this world
was a stage, wee the players whiche present the Comedie, and the gods the lookers on,
amongst whom belike he comprehended the Philosophers”), only to be inverted: these
days, Annibale tells us, “there are fewe divine lookers on” (118). Thus whereas in the
traditional topos descending from John of Salisbury, the moral person never acts the
part of another, for Annibale: “to be acceptable in companie, we must put off […] our
own fashions and manners,  and cloath ourselves with the conditions  of  others,  and
imitate them so farre as reason will permit” (105). While:
10
Annibale eventually adopts the view that self-knowledge and virtue actually emerge
from  the  theatrum  mundi  rather  than  against  it:  “For  if  you  consider  it  wel  the
judgment which wee have to knowe ourselves, is not ours, but wee borrow it of others”;
thus: “our judgements and the knowledge of our selves dependeth on the judgement
and conversation of many” (116). At this point the justification for civil conversation has
gone beyond the merely pragmatic.
11
To  conclude:  while  Guazzo  begins  by  addressing  himself  to  an  early  modern
understanding of conversation, he drives the notion in a modern direction: pragmatic
and secular rather than theological,  democratic  rather than hierarchical,  dynamic as
distinct from static and category-bound. Yet, pragmatic, collective and fundamentally
socio-centric  though it  be,  the  model  of  “civile  conversation”  remains  haunted by  a
suspicion  of  bad  faith:  profitable  participation  in  “civile  conversation”  requires  a
virtually  permanent  suspension of  ethical  judgement.  In  view of  the  viral  quality  of
12
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Holy Conversation
A man carelesse of his calling and suspected of whoredome
An honest man, a simple man
A verie lewd man in forgery and superstition
A dicer …
He liveth idely, and cometh seldome to church
He liveth as a pot companion; one Kendall hath the sheafe ….
As honest of life as such pettifoggers be …
A good dicer and carder, both night and daie
His conversation is most in houndes.15
conversation mentioned by Young Guazzo earlier (44), the possibility of corruption is all
too real. We are not so far from courtly conversation and the dominance of the habitus
after all. The adjective “civile” is largely aspirational. Guazzo might less flatteringly have
labeled his conversation “common”, as (we shall see) it is in two scenes (1.2 and 2.1) of
Two  Noble  Kinsmen,  which  taken  together  provide  an  extended  Shakespearean
reflection upon the conceptual problem faced by Guazzo.
In the very decade that Guazzo appeared in English, the Augustinian premise with
which he begins was vigorously affirmed by the puritans. “Conversation” would seem to
become  a  puritan  word  in  much  the  way  that  –  as  James  Simpson  suggests  –
“hypocrisy” becomes an anti-puritan word.14 In the puritan “surveys of the ministry” of
the 1580s, benefice-holding clergy were drawn up into lists, by deanery and county, to
be evaluated (among other criteria) against “their conversation”. To choose from many,
the 1586 survey  of  “the Deanrye of  Kerier”  in  Cornwall,  includes,  against  column 7
(“what his conversation is”), the following entries:
13
Conversation here is  not about performance in the narrow ecclesiological sense in
which Simpson insists that the term “hypocrisy” had originated. It is more about the
pastor’s  relationship with his  community.  It  is  an amphibious  criterion tying sacred
calling to secular space, and reforming the latter in terms of the former. The inherent
tension  of  this  polarity  comes  through  in  George  Gifford’s  The  Countrie  Divinitie
(London, 1582) which takes the form of a dialogue between a puritan (Zelotes) and a lax
Anglican (Atheos). Atheos defends his local minister (of Great Baddow in Essex) against
Zelotes, as competent “to reade the service as well as anye of them all”, while remaining,
“a verye good fellowe” (drinker, card-player, and bon viveur) outside the church (G.
Gifford, ibid., p. 1-2). The secular space should be left alone, argues Atheos. It is not the
preserve of  “busie Controulers”,  those “curious and precise fellowes,  which allow no
recreation” (ibid., p. 3) and who have no ecclesiastical authority for their strictures. We
are left with a stand-off. Where for Atheos everyday conversation should be entirely free
of religious interference, for Zelotes it must be Godly. Implicitly, the argument is over
the meaning of the adjective “profane”. Where Atheos might have taken this word “in
neutral  sense” as “lay;  civil,  as  distinguished from ecclesiastical”  (OED, 2.a);  Zelotes
would take it in the strong sense of “persons or things: unholy, or desecrating what is
holy  or  sacred”  (OED,  1).  The  formation  of  the  English  noun  “profanity”  (“profane
conduct  or  speech;  also  […]  a  profane  or  obscene  act  or  word”,  OED)  in  the  late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries testifies to the force of Zelotes’s insistence.16
Gifford’s influence was to spread well beyond puritan circles. The word “conversation”
is  sprinkled  liberally  through  George  Herbert’s  Anglican,  The  Countrey  Parson
(London, 1652), which not only echoes Gifford’s title but makes clear that the parson
must be of exemplary conversation to win the confidence of his flock (“neither will they
14
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beleeve him in the pulpit, whom they cannot trust in his Conversation”).17
While the puritans were not (unlike Annibale) prepared to condone verbal abuse “to
Godwarde”,  their  response  is  a  perfectly  logical  development  from  the  Augustinian
premise  of  Young Guazzo.  Accordingly  the  unlicenced preacher  John Angell  defines
conversation as:  “a word of  large extent,  it  reacheth to mans whole life,  and all  the
several passages and businesses thereof […] both in his thoughts, words, and actions,
wherein he converseth with God, man, or his own self”.18 Angell’s definition links vocal
speech to silent speech (thinking or musing) and spoken prayer to silent prayer in a
seamless  web.  Angell’s  usage  recalls  Augustine’s  Soliloquia  (from  which  the  term
“soliloquy” derives), and his Confessions, every word of which is addressed exclusively
to God.
15
It is roughly from 1576 – or the definitive split between Anglicanism and Puritanism
following  the  removal  of  Edmund  Grindal  as  Archbishop  of  Canterbury  –  that  a
distinctive speaking register appears.19  It  is  not too far a stretch to call  this  a  “holy
conversation”, borrowing Rona Goffen’s term for that genre of trecento Italian paintings
of  sacred figures  – typically,  the  virgin  and child  with  assorted  saints  – apparently
conversing with each-other in relatively informal pictorial spaces.20 Like the paintings
discussed  by  Goffen,  a  variously  “Christian”  or  “right”  or  “heavenly”  or  “holy”
conversation – explicitly advocated by puritan preachers such as Angell – attends to
various Pauline injunctions to sanctity of speech.21 Ephesians is but the most prominent
of such loci: it is precisely because the fledgling congregation of Ephesus is surrounded
by a pagan majority – “among whom wee also had our conuersation in times past in the
lusts of our flesh […] & of the mind” (2:3) – that Paul enjoins his flock to stop talking to
the Ephesians and converse among themselves in what sounds like a different dialect:
“speaking unto your selues in psalms / and hymnes, and spirituall songs” (5:19).22
16
Christian or holy conversation presumed a spiritual conversion (the two words share
an etymological link – verso / vertere (to turn) – that puritan writers derived from the
church fathers.23 The inward turn of the sect upon itself was mirrored externally as (in
Milton’s  words)  an  “incommunicable  antagony”  from the  mainstream or,  “a  certain
religious aversation and abhorring”.24 At its strongest, holy conversation divides spoken
discourse between the godly and the ungodly. There was no midway point, no sensus
communis.  All  that  was  not  godly  was  profane  in  the  strong  sense.  Who  were  the
ungodly? As Guazzo informs us, they could be anyone and everywhere; an all-embracing
and infiltrating otherness, to which the restless “turning” signaled in the etymology of
conversation was dangerously liable. One’s conversation was never simply one’s own.
Hence the peril of civil conversation. Holy conversation by contrast was hermetically
sealed within the self-styled Christian community; and in its relative predictability more
closely resembled monologue (sermon or discourse) than dialogue. When (as we shall
shortly see) Montaigne critiques the Huguenot style of conversation, he imagines it as a
monologue. When he imagines his own conversation, he imagines it as a dialogue, even
of the self  with itself.25  Montaigne’s  self is never solidly evident to itself  but  forever
turning itself in converse with a crowd of internalized faces.
17
What became of holy conversation? I have suggested that in comparison with the civil
mode  of  Guazzo  or  the  dialectical  mode of  Montaigne,  it  consolidates  the  pre-1586
senses  of  “conversation”  as  given by  the OED. A history  of  its  fortunes  in  the  later
seventeenth century is beyond our purview, but its eventual decline would seem to be
related to the rise of secular and enlightenment culture from the Restoration.26 Decline
however  is  not  disappearance.  It  lived  on  within  non-conformism  in  England,
Jansenism  in  France27,  and  cults  anywhere.  In  various  forms  of  religious
fundamentalism it persists to this day.
18
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Montaigne
The speech I love is a simple, natural speech, the same on paper as in the mouth; a
speech succulent and sinewy, brief and compressed, not so much dainty and well
combed as vehement and brusque […] rather difficult than boring, remote from
affectation, irregular, disconnected and bold; each bit making a body in itself; not
pedantic, not monkish, not lawyer-like, but rather soldierly.29
But where at this day are those true friendes to bee found? [...] I knowe not who is
your assured friende, but I am sure that I have not yet founde mine, with whom I
might use suche open, simple, and free behavior as you meane. For you must
thinke it a harde matter to finde in the worlde two heartes which love perfectly.
(167)
as our minde is fortified by the communication of regular and vigorous spirits; it
cannot well be expressed, how much it looseth and is bastardized, by the
continuall commerce and frequentation, we have with base, weake and dull spirits.
No contagion spreds it selfe further then that. (Florio, p. 519)
Montaigne’s approach to conversation is informed by Guazzo’s aversion to courtliness
and  his  more  idealistic  hopes  of  civil  conversation28,  but  with  the  difference  that
Montaigne champions these principles with a purpose lacking in Guazzo:
19
Guazzo is more guarded than this.  The difference is felt  again in their contrasting
attitudes to friendship. Where Guazzo respects the higher-order conversation of friends
in principle, he denies its possibility in practice:
20
Recalling  his  friendship  with  Etienne  de  la  Boétie,  Montaigne  presumes  just  this
possibility: that of an unguarded, intimate and heightened conversation altogether free
of  the  prudence  and  ceremony  employed  with  mere  acquaintances.  Like  puritan
conversation, Montaigne’s exchanges with La Boétie were linguistically distinctive: they
conversed in latin.30 From the moment of La Boétie’s death however, Montaigne is “in
motion” (to borrow from the title of Jean Starobinski’s study) from the “symmetry” of
his  friendship  to  the  “asymmetry”  of  his  public  relationship.31  At  the  same  time
however,  the  title  of  the  Essais  continues  to  reference  his  pact  with  La  Boétie.32
Montaigne is never less than intimate, forceful, frank and truth-seeking.
21
This  said,  I  want  to  draw  attention  to  an  aspect  of  Montaigne’s  thinking  about
conversation that is proleptically modern and enlightened. It is found principally in the
essay Sur l’art de conférer (c. 1582) that Florio translates in 1603 as “Of the Arte of
conferring”.33  Conversing here is an art of the mind, a free exploration of ideas and
opinions, less to be valued for its utility than as, “the most fruitful and natural exercise
of  our  spirit”  (Florio,  op.  cit.,  p.  519).  It  is  a  conception  from  which  rhetoric  or
interested  persuasion,  is  excluded.  Montaigne actively  wants  to  be  bested  in  such a
conversation.  What  he  wants  is  disinterested discussion that  is  yet  vigorous,  rough,
impassioned and completely unrespecting of persons and place. A “stubborn wit […] a
sturdy wrestler” (Florio, p. 519) is preferable to mealy-mouthed deference:
22
For Montaigne, habitus-bound conversation debilitates in its very principle. At the
heart of Montaigne’s idea of conversation is freedom from “tyrannie, both verball and
effectuall”  (Florio,  p.  524).  This  doesn't  mean just  tyrants  but  princes  as  such,  like
Guazzo’s old master in whose company the courtier, “cannot utter his minde freely nor
doe anything contrarie to their pleasure” (S. Guazzo, op. cit., p. 210). In his Discours de
la servitude volontaire,  La Boétie  had excluded tyrants from friendship or  even the
possibility of conversation for the reason that their conversant must always defer and so
fail  to  provide  the  mental  resistance  that  real  conversation  thrives  on.34  Religious
23
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authorities are similarly constraining, whereas for Montaigne conversation is less about
securing  the  self  in  a  fortress  of  right  belief  than  a  willing  surrender  of  self-
confirmation:  “publishing  and  accusing  my  imperfections”  (Florio,  p.  518).
Conversation in short is more about finding the question than knowing the answer. In
the “conference” essay, Montaigne contrasts his own Popper-like will  to falsification,
with Huguenot conformism. Hence he suggests, “these times are fit for us to reforme us
backward [my italics]; more by dissenting than by consenting; more by difference then
by accord”.35 Florio’s choice of the word “reforme” unmistakably evokes the English co-
religionists of Montaigne’s Huguenots.36  Montaigne goes on to suggest that reformed
conversation convinces less by the merits of its argument than by rhetorical props, “the
gravity, the gown, and the fortune of him that speaketh” (Florio, p. 523).
But  if  Montaigne’s  Socratic  kind of  conversation  is  so  powerful  a  solvent  of  pre-
existing belief and thus of secular and religious authority, by what criterion would one
decide the truth of  anything?  Here Montaigne has  recourse to  an idea  of  “common
sense”,  not  in  the  sense  of  what  he  once  called  common  foolishness  (“l’insipience
commune”)37 – suggestive of Voltaire’s sens commun (“crude reason […] the first notion
of ordinary things, a state midway between stupidity and intelligence”)38 – nor in the
reductive  cynicism of  an Iago  or  an  Edmund,  but  in  the  sense  of  Juvenal’s  sensus
communis.  In  his  eighth  satire,  Juvenal  contrasts  common  sense  with  aristocratic
pretension: “common sense is seldom found in fortunes that so much abound” (Raris
enim ferme sensus communis in illa fortuna).39 This is because aristocrats are obsessed
with bloodline at the expense of  broad human empathy or social solidarity.  Juvenal
reminds his readers that many of the great Roman houses can be traced to plebeian
roots, and that some of the worthiest Romans – Cicero, Gaius Marius, Gaius Mucius,
Horatius  Cocles  –  were  themselves  commoners.  Contrariwise,  some  of  the  worst  –
Catiline and Cethegus – were aristocrats. The true citizen has sensus communis in the
sense of generous sympathy and a broad spectrum of social engagement. In Montaigne,
I would suggest, sensus communis retains the wider social meaning of Juvenal but with
a  shift  of  emphasis  from Republican  patriotism to  a  concern  for  shared values  and
sustained ethical  reflection.  This of  course has nothing to do with godliness or  holy
conversation. The person Montaigne admires is free-thinking (“my reason is not framed
to bend or stoope, my knees are”), un-impressed by “overdarkened […] gravity” (Florio,
p.526) or claims to authority. He is open of mien and predisposed to thinking that, “the
plainest reasons, are the best seated”, and that “the meanest and most beaten, are best
applied  unto  affaires”  (Florio,  p.  525).  Above  all,  sensus  communis  in  Montaigne
suggests a capacity for independent judgement whose very condition is a broad social
empathy that constantly gives rise to ethical reflection. These thoughts are not entirely
new. To some extent they are anticipated by Guazzo: “Disputation is the sifter out of the
trueth. And for so much as the trueth is taken from the common consent and opinions
of  men,  those  opinions  can  not  be  knowen but  by  conversation  and  companie”  (S.
Guazzo,  p.  41).  What neither Montaigne nor Guazzo openly acknowledge is  that the
ethical  value  they  place  on  sensus  communis  contradicts  the  Pauline  notion  of
“solidarity in sin”.40 It is a marker of their modernity.
24
It might be objected that Montaigne’s idea of conversation is not at all new, that it
simply reiterates the Platonic dialogue. This is true as far as it goes, but the iteration
makes all the difference. In a recent article for Philosophy and Literature, Ann Hartle
argues that Montaigne redefines the Platonic ideal of wisdom as a “sociable wisdom”.41
In  the  allegory  of  the  cave,  Plato  imagines  the  workaday  crowd  as  satisfied  by  the
shadows of reality projected on the wall of the cave. Wisdom is to be sought outside the
cave whence the real forms of ideas originate. Hence Plato’s philosopher – the lover of
wisdom – is he who turns his back on the crowd and strides out into the austere light of
25
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The art of dialectic is not the art of being able to win every argument. On the
contrary, it is possible that someone who is practicing the art of dialectic, ie. the art
of questioning and seeking truth, comes off worse in the argument in the eyes of
those listening to it. Dialectic, as the art of asking questions, proves itself only
because the person who knows how to ask questions is able to persist in his
questioning; which involves being able to preserve his orientation towards
openness. The art of questioning is that of being able to go on asking questions, ie.
the art of thinking. It is called 'dialectic', for it is the art of conducting a real
conversation […]. [It] consists not in trying to discover the weakness of what is
said, but in bringing out its real strength […] [It] is the art of the formation of
concepts, as the working out of the common meaning.45
truth.  By  contrast,  Montaigne’s  philosopher  finds  truth  within  the  cave.  “Sociable
wisdom” starts in the real world – that of the cave – but transvalues it, seeking, “the
transformation of the human world, the production of society, a new mode of human
association”  (A.  Hartle,  op.  cit.,  p.  285).  Montaigne’s  is  a  wisdom  focused  not  on
unchanging essence but on “the possible” (ibid., p. 290), or the potential of experience
to become something beyond itself. Experience by itself is associated with complacency
or “presumption” – a self-esteem preening itself on its understanding (ibid.,  p.  291).
Hence experience can make the journey to possibility only via a philosophy that forgoes
its  “superiority” (ibid.,  p.  294)  or  intellectual  pride,  in  solidarity  with the “common
good” (itself attuned to a criterion of “common sense”). Accordingly Hartle cites Pascal’s
description  of  Montaigne’s  style  as  “totally  composed  of  thoughts  born  out  of  the
ordinary conversations of life” (ibid., p. 295). Thus, rather than a profession or vocation,
philosophy for Montaigne is “unpremeditated and accidental”42;  it  is  an activity that
arises in the course of that “strong and manly” conversation that pleased him by its
“sharpness and vigour”. As in his essays, conversation for Montaigne has the quality of
“essaying oneself”: “for there is nothing more pleasant in association with men than the
trials  (essais)  of  strength  we  have  with  one  another”.43  It  is  vital  that  the  trial  be
disinterested,  divorced  from personal  investment  and  authority  claims.  Montaigne’s
idea  of  conversation  in  other  words  is  everything  that  early  modern  or  puritan
conversation was not. It is open, not closed; exploratory rather than authoritarian; a
dialogue rather than a catechism or sermon; defamiliarizing rather than habitus-bound.
And it plays the ball not the man; it seeks to convince of course, but has no design of
“converting” its audience into a different faith. It is like a wrestler who throws you but
then pulls you back up for another bout. For all this, it is holy in the sense of presuming
complete  good  faith  in  its  interlocutor  and  so  forswearing  any  recourse  to  the
conversational vices of hypocrisy, dishonest persuasion or verbal abusiveness.
It  is  the  sociability  of  Montaigne’s  idea  of  wisdom that  distinguishes  this  kind of
conversation from the Platonic dialogue, and it is this social quality too that anticipates
enlightenment iterations of the notion of sensus communis  in Shaftesbury’s  essay of
that title, and in Kant’s reiteration of Shaftesbury. Sensus communis itself would appear
to  anticipate  Kant’s  “idea  for  a  universal  history”,  (which  envisions  a  cosmopolitan
extension  of  civic  solidarity),  the  Enlightenment  dialectic  and  Hegel’s  geist.
Conversation of the kind foreseen by Montaigne is implicitly: philosophy, the dialectic,
Jameson’s “aporetic thinking”, Derrida’s “thinking of the path”44. The linkage is explicit
in Hans Georg Gadamer:
26
The  profundity  and  modernity  of  Montaigne’s  L’Art  de  Conférer  –  in  which
conversation is not just a mode of discussion but a potential dialectic whereby the world
is called upon to reinvent itself in a recursive movement of reflection – is unmistakable
when viewed from the perspective of Milton’s deeper reflections on the cosmic ecology
of conversation in Paradise Lost. When Adam pleads for the society of an equal with
27
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A nice and subtle happiness I see
Thou to thyself proposes, in the choice
Of thy associates, Adam, and wilt taste
No pleasure, though in pleasure, solitary. (8.399-402)
Thou in thy secrecy although alone,
Best with thy self accompanied, seek’st not
Social communication, yet so pleased,
Canst raise thy creature to what highth thou wilt
Of union or communion deified;
I by conversing cannot these erect
From prone, nor in their ways complacence find. (8.427-33)
whom to converse, God answers as follows:
It is almost a reproof: conversation is made to sound like a luxury. Adam’s current
“associates” – the animals – he finds insufficient, and so too his happiness. Solitariness
(the  condition  of  God),  he  concedes,  is  superior,  but  only  because  in  God,  “is  no
deficience found” (8.416).  Conversation (which includes “collateral  love,  and dearest
amity”, 8.426), is the flip-side of deficiency; it  is a need provoked by the first man’s
consciousness that he is, “in unity defective” (8.425). Is a loving conversation proper to
humanity at once a comfort and yet a fit marker of man’s inferiority to God? Or would
Adam’s persistence in a solitary condition also have been proper, while inviting God to
raise man to a yet higher “communion” with the deity, and thus a more perfect estate?
Adam seems ambiguous on this point:
28
Paradoxically,  the  solitary  God can raise  his  creatures  to  any height  of  “union or
communion  deified”.  By  comparison  with  this  ontologically  direct  and  fruitful
communion, human conversation is superficial, having no good purchase on the being
of the lower animals, and – the poem goes on to make clear – on ourselves. Unlike in
Montaigne  then,  conversation  for  the  Milton  of  Paradise  Lost  (if  not  of  the
Areopagitica)  is  a  dead  end.  It  is  not  a  world-shaping  power.  It  has  no  deeper
philosophical significance.
29
To summarize: in this brief survey of early modern English notions of conversation,
we have identified four main positions along a friable spectrum of meaning. To begin
with (as suggested by the first six senses given in the OED), the word “conversation” is
primarily  an  “action  of  consorting”  that  prioritizes  the  habitus  over  the  individual
speaker.  Secondly (1581-86)  the  translations  of  Guazzo introduce a notion of  “civile
conversation” which, while aiming at a degree of speakerly autonomy from the habitus
(typified by courtesy in Castiglione),  end in a pragmatism whereby moral claims are
largely  suspended.  Third,  from  the  mid  1580s,  we  find  two  species  of  “holy
conversation”:  the  puritan  practice  of  “Christian  conversation”  and  an  essentially
literary idealization of conversation between true friends which itself can be imagined in
Christian terms (as we shall see it is in Two Noble Kinsmen).  Though civil  and holy
conversations are sharply contrasting – the one open and secular, the other closed and
godly – they are finally alike in conceding the immersiveness of habitus over autonomy.
Thus where Guazzo advises the speaker to defer to the profanity of civil conversation (as
its inevitable corrollary), the puritans fashion the rival habitus of Christian conversation
to  prioritize  godliness.  Finally  Montaigne,  who  is  influenced  both  by  the  holy
conversation of friendship and the open conversation of Guazzo, pioneers a model of
conversation  that  is  at  once  morally  autonomous  and  intellectually  adventurous:  a
disinterested and unrhetorical truth-seeking that relies on and actively seeks out shared
understandings of a kind capable of evolving new meanings. Here it must be conceded
that relative to the other three models of conversation, Montaigne’s (at its most far-
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Shakespeare
[N]o man is the lord of anything,
Though in and of him there be much consisting,
Till he communicate his parts to others.
Nor doth he of himself know them for aught
Till he behold them formed in th’applause
Where they’re extended (3.3.110-15).
reaching in “The Art of Conferring”) is far less culturally representative. Were the four
stages  to  be  ranked  along  a  continuum  of  residual,  dominant  and  emergent,  then
conversation as an “action of consorting” would be residual, civil and holy conversation
would dispute the dominance between them, whereas Montaigne’s conception would be
emergent.
How  does  this  conversational  spectrum  track  in  Shakespeare?  Does  it  track  in
Shakespeare? It  does,  I  shall  suggest,  and over its  entire spectrum. In view of  their
dominant status, we should hardly be surprised to find civil and holy conversation. They
contribute  to  characterization  and  dramatic  quality  generally.  Yet  beyond  this,
Shakespeare (as we shall  see) makes theoretical interventions to both conversational
kinds, where conversation is elaborated as a theme in its own right far beyond the needs
of specific dramatic contexts. I shall consider two such interventions, one on civil and
the other on holy conversation. Shakespeare’s  treatment of holy conversation is  also
remarkable in non-theoretical ways that I shall also touch upon. First, he uses it against
the grain of fellow playwrights such as Jonson and Middleton for whom it is a way of
satirizing  puritans.  Second,  as  I  hope  to  show,  it  furnishes  an  important  structural
feature in a significant number of plays. What of dialectical conversation? In view of its
bare emergence and recondite nature, we might be surprised to find any evidence of it
in the plays. Not only is it present however but, I will suggest, it accounts for some of
Shakespeare’s least accountable moments.
31
We can begin with the theoretical reflection on civil conversation. The plays are of
course permeated by civil and courtly conversation per se.46 But the significance of the
reflection is that civil conversation is interrogated at a philosophical level. As we have
seen, Guazzo’s theory of civil conversation culminates in the realization that the self is
radically insufficient: “the judgment which wee have to knowe ourselves, is not ours, but
wee borrow it of others” (p.116); it takes other people to tell us who we really are and to
make us who we really are. Many ironies arise from this unsettling realization, Iago’s “I
am not what I am” (1.1.65) being one. Iago does not say, “I am not what I pretend to be”,
but “I am not what I am”. The repetition of the present tense of the verb, just after its
negation  presents  a  strong  paradox.  Iago  means  not  just  that  his  social  persona  is
contradicted by his inner person, but that the two are symbiotic (the inner Iago needs
the outer Iago in order – as Nietzsche might say – to become who he is: Iago is literally
nothing if not “honest”). Guazzo’s unsettling insight is approached more theoretically in
Troilus and Cressida:
32
While Ulysses is hardly an honest broker, his logic is compelling: personal heroism
has no social existence unless communicated to others. Contrariwise, communication
can make things “poor in worth” seem “dear in esteem” (3.3.135, 134). This means that,
“one touch of nature makes the whole world kin” (3.3.169); which is to say that a single
shared attribute (such as size) is sufficient to make the inauthentic pass for authentic
(Ajax is superficially like Achilles and superior if public opinion is on his side).47 But it
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This is not strange, Ulysses.
The beauty that is borne here in the face
The bearer knows not, but commends itself
To others’ eyes. Nor doth the eye itself,
That most pure spirit of sense, behold itself,
Not going from itself; but eye to eye opposed
Salutes each other with each other’s form.
For speculation turns not to itself
Till it hath travelled and is mirrored there
Where it may see itself. This is not strange at all. (3.3.97-106)
also  means  that  communication  or  conversation  is  a  fundamentally  denaturing  or
duplicitous activity. Civil conversation is less a forum than a marketplace; a corrupted
currency. This is the opinion of a single character of course, but it is articulated with
considerable philosophical care and credited to a book (Guazzo?) that Ulysses happens
to be reading at that very moment. Achilles may not have read the book but he is au fait
with the general position:
Knowledge  of  the  self  comes  from  others;  it  is  a  knowledge  gained  less  by
introspection than an anxious “turning” outward. The verdict of the other is pitiless but
also frivolous; novelty trumps genuine worth. The conversation in which the self finds
itself is hardly idealized. For all this, there is no suggestion in Shakespeare that normal
conversation is necessarily “profane” in the strongly pejorative sense.
34
This  might  lead  us  to  expect  that  holy  conversation  (which  does  find  normal
conversation profane in the strongly pejorative sense) would play little or no part in the
plays  except  as  caricature.  Shakespeare  caricatures  puritan  speech  occasionally,  but
sparingly in comparison with contemporaries such as Jonson and Middleton (Twelfth
Night is the obvious example). But I now suggest that holy conversation features on its
own terms, extensively if unobtrusively, in the plays.
35
This brings  us  to  the  second theoretical  intervention that  we are  to  consider:  the
entirely  sympathetic  meditation  on  holy  conversation  in  1.2  and  2.1  of  Two  Noble
Kinsmen).  The first  of  these two scenes introduces us to Palamon and Arcite in the
Thebes  of  Sophocles  and  Aeschylus.  The  play’s  opening  scene  is  reminiscent  of
Antigone:  three  distraught  queens  petition  Theseus  in  the  midst  of  his  marriage
celebration to avenge the fate of  their  husbands, whose bodies have been left to rot
unburied outside the walls of Thebes. At this (and suggestive of Oedipus at Colonus)
Theseus  chastises  Creon  for  his  impiety.  Before  this  however  we  are  introduced  to
Palamon and Arcite, who though Theban themselves,  both regard Thebes as tainted,
specifically in respect of its conversation. Arcite entreats Palamon to join him in fleeing
Thebes while they are “yet unhardened in / The crimes of nature” (1.2.2-3). Remaining
in Thebes would damn them in either of  two ways. On the one hand, “to follow the
common  stream,  ‘twould  bring  us  to  an  eddy  /  where  we  should  turn  or  drown”
(1.2.9-10). I suggest that “turn” here means “convert”, playing on its latin equivalent
verso/versere which is also a root of “conversion” and “conversation” alike. The point is
to reform themselves and so resist drowning in the “common stream”.48 On the other
hand, to reform or resist  “the temptings in’t” (1.2.4),  would itself  be “not to swim /
I’th’aid o’th’current” (1.2.7-8) and, “almost to sink” (1.2.7). In Thebes, “every evil […]
Hath  a  good colour”  (1.2.38-9),  but  refusing  to  conform to  the  Theban  norm must
expose the friends as “mere monsters” (1.2.42). For Arcite, one imbibes the wickedness
of Thebes merely by participating in its conversation. Thus, “our milk / Will relish of the
pasture, and we must / Be vile or disobedient” (1.2.76-8). For Palamon the dilemma is
not so clear-cut: daily converse with the wicked is not necessarily corrupting: “another’s
gait […] is  not  catching / Where there is  faith” (1.2.45-6).  Either way, Palamon and
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Let’s think this prison holy sanctuary,
To keep us from corruption of worse men.
We are young and yet desire the ways of honour,
That liberty and common conversation
The poison of pure spirits, might like women
Woo us to wander from […]. (2.2.71-6)
We are one another’s wife […]. Were we at liberty,
A wife might part us lawfully, or business;
Quarrels consume us; envy of ill men
Crave our acquaintance. (2.2.80, 88-91)
What had we been, old in the court of Creon,
Where sin is justice, lust and ignorance
The virtues of the great ones? [....]
We had died as they do, ill old men, unwept,
And had their epitaphs, the people’s curses (2.2.105-10)
Arcite are as sensitive as Young Guazzo to “our covenants with language” and the small
print of these covenants.
In 2.1, after the defeat of Thebes and their capture, Palamon and Arcite resume their
discussion  of  the  morally  compromising  effects  of  Theban  conversation.  To  Arcite,
prison is just the discipline for which he has been yearning:
37
Whereas in prison:
“Common  conversation”  in  this  context  is  neither  low  in  the  sense  of  class
(Shakespeare’s  “public  manners”),  nor  high  in  the  sense  of  the  court.  It  is  rather,
Guazzo’s “civile conversation” seen from a holy standpoint. Significantly, the theme of
friendship has become intertwined with that of conversation. In Richard Edwardes’s
Damon and Pithias, friendship had been offset against the corrupt court of Dionysius in
an ethical sense only. In Two Noble Kinsmen the suggestion is that friendship is marked
off from the courtly milieu of Castiglione and the civic milieu of Guazzo by the purity of
its conversation. Imagine, Palamon continues:
38
In prison, Palamon and Arcite find an equivalent of Christian conversation. While, their
language might not be overtly Christian, it is undeniably holy. The extended discussion
conducted in these scenes might be read as a critique of “civile conversation” from the
point of view of holy conversation.
If holy conversation is  the subject of extended reflection in this  play, it  also plays
important  characterological  and  structural  roles  in  others.  We  can  begin  with  the
second tetralogy. These plays are built on the problem of identity: its possession, loss,
and recuperation. Thus in 1 Henry IV, the king and his son virtually echo each-other in
a desire to recover themselves. “I will from henceforth be more myself” (1.3.5), claims
Henry to  the  Percies.  “I  shall  hereafter,  my thrice gracious lord,  /  Be more myself”
(3.2.92-3),  pleads  Hal.  But  what  is  being  oneself?  For  both  characters  it  means
recovering themselves from their respective conversational disorders.
39
For  the  father,  a  king  faced  with  rebellious  subjects,  being  himself,  means  being
“Mighty and to be feared” (1.3.6). It means behaving like a king rather than a peer or a
friend. Henry revealingly represents his habitual “condition” as, “smooth as oil, soft as
young down” (1.3.7). This is revealing because disingenuous courtesy is also part of his
political character. Thus in Richard II, we hear of Henry working the crowd when going
into exile, doffing his bonnet to “an oyster wench” (1.4.30), bowing the knee to “a brace
of draymen” (1.4.31); diving into the hearts of the common people, “with humble and
familiar courtesy” (1.4.25). Henry seems to have forgotten that before making a habit of
40
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You shall this twelve month term from day to day,
Visit the speechless sick, and still converse
With groaning wretches (5.2.42-4)
ingratiation, he was the champion of principle, refusing to back down at any cost. The
Bolingbroke who challenged Mowbray had acted out of a much more robust sense of
himself. This leaves us with a question. When Henry speaks of being “more himself”,
does  he  mean returning  to  the  implacability  of  his  challenge to  Mowbray,  or  being
ingratiating as is his habit, or simply adopting the conventional persona of a king? Does
he himself know what he means? I doubt it. His selfhood seems stranded somewhere
between being and seeming, ordained and acquired, essence and adaptability, inside
and outside.
Let's  now turn to Hal’s  promise  to be  “more myself”.  Like  his  father,  we have to
assume that prior to his delinquency, Hal had started out more or less “like himself”.
But his delinquency makes for a curious parallel with his father’s “humble and familiar
courtesy”. The father’s “courtesy” is the exact opposite. But at a deeper level – relative to
their theoretically “real” selves – it too is a delinquency, a conversational disorder. This
may  be  less  obviously  true  of  Bolingbroke.  But  from  midway  through  Richard  II,
Bolingbroke  falls  into  an  equivocal  kind  of  nullity  relative  to  the  confident  and
outspoken man who had started the play. It is not just that equivocation – over the issue
of whether Richard is resigning the crown or Bolingbroke is taking it – is in his interest.
It  is  more that  he  disappears  into  that  equivocation like  a  fish into  its  camouflage.
Wavering between reasserting his feudal identity as the son of John of Gaunt, and the
need to be seen as receiving the crown by default rather than taking it by force, Henry’s
centre  of  gravity  evaporates.  He  becomes  curiously  passive,  weightless  and
directionless:  dependent  on  the  default  or  support  of  others.  This  state  of  drift  is
something he never fully recovers from.
41
Unlike his  father,  Hal has  a grip on his  conversational  disorder,  with the vow of,
“redeeming the time, when men think least I will” (1.2.214.). Though his logic is all too
politic (Hal will exceed men’s hopes by setting a low ceiling of expectation), his imagery
is distinctly religious. The phrase “redeeming the time” echoes St. Paul’s injunction to
Christian  conversation  in  Ephesians:  “Take  heed  therefore  that  yee  walke
circumspectly,  not as fooles,  but as wise,  /  Redeeming the season: for the dayes are
euill.”  (5:  15-16).49  Figuratively,  Hal’s  return  to  form  will  be  a  reformation  (“my
reformation glitt’ring o’er my fault”, 1.3.210); conversion from a depraved conversation
to  a  holy  one.  The  emphasis  is  quite  deliberate.  Holy  conversation  here  signifies  a
recovery  of  true selfhood  from the  profane  conversation  of  the  theatrum mundi  in
which men seek to play parts not their own. Hal’s hint of a coming “reformation” is not
accidental. It is part of a pattern in Shakespeare. Yet if this is granted a question arises
as to the precise function of the Pauline imagery at this point: is it not a little grandiose?
What Hal promises to do is not just redeem himself, but “redeem the time”, because (as
Ephesians  continues), “the days are evil”. My suggestion here is that the reference to
Ephesians points to a wider remit. The disorder that Hal means to redress is not just his
own or even the tavern’s but that of the kingdom – whose disorder stems as well from
his  father’s  failure  to  converse  “like  himself”.  A  king  who  is  “himself”  redeems  a
kingdom fallen on evil days because when he converses with his kingdom it becomes
like itself.
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The theme of holy conversation is surprisingly insistent in a number of other plays,
and always  in  tension with  a  sense of  conversational  disorder.  It  book-ends  several
comedies.  Here  is  where  its  structural  character  is  seen.  In  Love’s  Labour’s  Lost,
Berowne is ordered:
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Olivia Now sir, what is your text?
Viola Most sweet lady –
Olivia A comfortable doctrine, and much may be said of it. Where lies your text?
Viola In Orsino’s bosom.
Olivia In his bosom? In what chapter of his bosom?
Viola To answer by the method, in the first of his heart.
Olivia O, I have read it. It is heresy. (1.5.211-18)
Captain Why, and fool, thou shalt love thy Neighbour and help him in extremis.
Nicholas Mass I think it be indeed; in what Chapter’s that, Cousin?
Captain Why in the first of Charity, the second verse.
Nicholas The first of Charity, quath a, that's a good jest, there is no such chapter in
my book!
Captain No. I know twas torn out of thy Book, and that makes so little in thy heart.
(1.4.128-36) 51
This is not just an alternation of Lenten penitence with festivity, but a re-gearing of
Berowne’s  conversation  from  playful  to  Pauline.  After  his  year-long  penitential
aversation from wit, Rosalind hopes to find Berowne: “empty of that fault, / Right joyful
of  your  reformation”  (3.2.60-1,  my  italics).  There  is  even  a  hint  of  puritanism:
“Henceforth my wooing mind will  be expressed / In  russet  yeas,  and honest  kersey
noes”  (5.2.412-13).  Lower  class  puritans  were  said  by  Matthew Sutcliffe  to  “go  like
clownes in russet clokes”.50 In Twelfth Night, the alternation of holiness and festivity
works the other way round: here the festive outburst is prefaced by a playful catechism:
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Though witty, Olivia’s conversational mode is clearly “holy” and far from caricature.
Her mourning dress would have been indistinguishably puritan, as is suggested in a
spin-off  play,  The Puritan Widow,  where  Olivia’s  dialogue (or  a  close equivalent)  is
heard in the mouth of a now caricature puritan. This is “Nicholas Saint-Antlings”, one of
three servants of the puritan widow who enter “in black scurvy mourning coats, and
books  at  their  girdles,  as  coming  from  church”  (1.3).  I  suggest  that  the  following
exchange between Nicholas and a Captain echoes Olivia’s exchange with Viola:
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Middleton must have recognized the holy character of Olivia’s conversation in order to
have adapted it as caricature.
The Merchant of Venice and Measure for Measure also juxtapose holy conversation
with common. To the extent that their language is respectively Christian and Jewish,
Antonio and Shylock live in separate conversational worlds, each holy in his own way.
What they share  is  a  language of  commerce.  Shylock spells  out  the  distinction with
admirable clarity: “I will buy with you, sell with you, talk with you, walk with you and so
following, but I will not eat with you, drink with you, nor pray with you” (1.3.33-35). The
Christian plot consists of two kinds of holy conversation – that of marriage and that of
friendship – each pitted against the other. Figuratively, Portia’s marriage with Bassanio
is  redemptive:  “Since  you are  dear  bought,  I  will  love  you  dear”  (3.2.311)  echoes  1
Corinthians 6:20: “For ye are bought for a price”.52 Yet Antonio’s love for Bassanio is
equally redemptive and eventually challenges the marriage bond for priority. In the ring
symbolism of the fifth Act, the play affirms the holy conversation of marriage over that
of friendship. In Measure for Measure, Isabella is called upon to quit the sanctuary of
her convent (in which converse with men is forbidden) for the corrupt conversational
world of Vienna which then infects her with its virus. The process begins in 2.1, the first
of two scenes in which she pleads with the magistrate Angelo for the life of her brother.
Isabella’s pleading has no effect on Angelo until energized by a performance coach she
hadn’t asked for: one of the most disreputable figures in the play, Lucio. The growing
passion of her delivery seduces Angelo without either of them quite knowing what has
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For who would bear the whips and scorns of time,
The oppressor’s wrong, the proud man’s contumely,
The pangs of dispriz’d love, the law’s delay,
The insolence of office and the spurns
That patient merit of the unworthy takes […] ? (3.1.72-76)
happened.  In  the  end  Isabella  forgives  Angelo  because  she  recognizes  her  real  if
unwitting complicity in his downfall. The way back to the convent is then barred by a
marriage proposal she cannot refuse. Vienna claims her for its own. In all five of these
plays holy conversation is both a theme and a structure.
We  can  now  turn  to  the  question  of  whether  the  barely  emergent  end  of  the
conversational spectrum – the quasi-enlightenment type found in Montaigne’s Art of
Conferring – also tracks in Shakespeare. This type, as we have seen, relies on a criterion
of sensus communis in the moral and republican spirit of Juvenal. We can begin with a
speech which relies on the ancient republican truism that Romans are not bondmen.
“Who is here so base that would be a bondman?” (3.2.29-30), asks Brutus;  Caesar’s
death is regrettable, but a living Caesar must have reduced all citizens to the status of
subjects or “abjects”. That the Romans are not finally swayed by this rhetorical question
suggests  that  Brutus  was  over-optimistic  about  the  ethical  level  of  their  sensus
communis. Shakespeare’s heavily qualified portrait of Brutus seems of a piece with his
general skepticism as regards ancient republican values, sensus communis included.53
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Yet  for  Shakespeare  sensus  communis  does  not  belong  exclusively  to  the  ancient
republican thought world. Just  as  for Montaigne, it  can take on a more progressive
nuance. Consider this extended rhetorical question from Hamlet’s “To be or not to be”
soliloquy:
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Oddly for a prince who is all too conscious of his royalty, Hamlet democratically invokes
the frustrations of the common yet estimable citizen, the man of “patient merit”. It is
precisely the decent and constructive people, those around whom an enlightened sensus
communis might potentially form who are driven to suicide. In Hamlet’s mind, those
who are driven to suicide are the good rather than the wicked, and commoners rather
than aristocrats.
A more famously progressive moment is Shylock’s speech on the humanity of Jews in
The Merchant of Venice. It is a speech that reaches out for a sensus communis that the
play – built on the popular premise that anti-semitism is  sens commun  in Voltaire’s
sense (“crude reason […] the first notion of ordinary things”) – insists is not there. But
the power of the speech is such as to challenge that premise and accuse what passes for
common sense with the charge of natural injustice. It is not so much the content of the
speech that is challenging. We recognize here a variant of the same commonplace voiced
by Henry the night before Agincourt: laying his exceptionalism aside, the king is a man,
and must feel danger like any other. The difference is that the Jew is exceptional in a
pejorative sense. What makes Shylock’s voicing of this now up-ended commonplace so
challenging is the dialogue it conducts with the horizon of belief to which his play and
its scapegoating conventions are tied: the stubborn premise of anti-semitism and race
hatred. To this,  the speech is an irruption, an aporia  demanding thought (Derrida’s
“thinking of the path”). Unlike Othello (shut up within his locus  as Robert Weimann
might put  it)  Shylock takes the floor (Weimann’s platea).54  He is  an interlocutor,  a
virtual  raisonneur,  able  to  call  his  play,  along  with  most  of  its  characters  and  its
audience into question. There is an irony however. That Shylock’s appeal for human
solidarity should end in a threat of revenge (“If we are like you in the rest,/ we will
resemble you in that”, 3.1.63-64), invokes the Pauline notion of “solidarity in sin”, the
reactionary antitype of sensus communis.
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King Harry I myself heard the King say he would not be ransomed.
Williams Ay, he said so, to make us fight cheerfully, but
when our throats are cut he may be ransomed, and
we ne’er the wiser. (4.1.195-8)
Here then are three moments that to varying degrees approach Montaigne’s all but
enlightened version of sensus communis. For my final example I want to return to the
Henriad, and a passage in which opposed notions of conversation clash: that whereby
the king understands himself as himself, and that whereby the common man takes stock
of his situation. As king in Henry V, Hal commands an exemplary conversation with
himself as with his subjects. On the night before Agincourt he tests the limits of this
conversation – the degree to which it is participated by the common soldier – by going
undercover  among his  troops.  To  his  displeasure  Hal  does  not  see  “himself”  in  the
mirror of his soldiers’ discourse, but instead a cynical face that he refuses to recognize.
When (as “Harry le Roi”) Hal hints that Sir Thomas Erpingham is pessimistic about the
English prospects, Bates asks whether Sir Thomas has communicated this to the king.
Hal  replies  that  “it  is  not  meet  he  should”  (4.1.100)  and  follows  up  with  the
commonplace  that,  his  royalty  laid  aside,  the  king is  but  a  man and must  feel  this
danger as any man would. When Bates takes this to mean that the king would rather be
up to his neck in the Thames, Hal indignantly objects. The king would rather be exactly
where he is. Fine, replies Bates, just so long as the king were here alone. That way, the
king would be ransomed, and “many poor mens’ lives [would be] saved” (4.1.121). Hal
takes this  personally:  “I  dare  say  you love him not  so  ill  to wish /  him here  alone,
howsoever you speak this to feel other / men’s minds” (4.1.122-24). But “feeling” other
men’s minds is exactly the problem with this conversation. The king might be a man
naturally but he is not socially or politically. He is literally beyond conversation with
other men because he is the antithesis of sensus communis and incapable of its truth.
Williams and Bates are unimpressed with Hal’s claim that, “his cause [is] just and his
quarrel honourable” (4.1.126-7) and hold him responsible for the carnage to come. Hal
objects with a long passage of casuistry – reminiscent of the casuistry of the “salic law”
passage of 1.1 – at the end of which he finds that his men distrust him as much as they
did to start with:
50
Hal wants to see the common sense argument of Williams and Bates as mere cynicism.
But it is something more, an open-eyed critique of royal pretence. It is at least half way
along  the  thought-path  towards  the  proto-enlightened  sensus  communis  that
Montaigne borrowed from Juvenal.
Versions of Montaigne’s notion of common sense are present in Shakespeare then,
even though he is  neither  an enthusiast  of  ancient  republicanism nor  a  progressive
democrat. Much more eye-catching however is the lowest common denominator version
of common sense, as in Iago, Edmund and other blunt speakers such as the Bastard
Faulconbridge.  Common  sense  in  such  figures  is  more  often  sens  commun,  a
provocation to reaction rather than an invitation to thought. Consider Kent’s abuse (in
the voice of the blunt-speaking Caius) of Oswald as, “a one-trunk-inheriting-slave” (The
Tragedy of King Lear, 2.2.27). This is the epitome of reactionary feudalism, the virtual
opposite of Hamlet’s class-warrior defence of “patient merit”. Yet at its most viciously
reactionary however (as in Iago) it  seems to me that  such common sense opens up
aporia that are alive with progressive possibility.
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Iago is a master of “common conversation” in the class-bound sense of being impolite
or uncivil. Like Faulconbridge and Edmund, he is a bluntly spoken interlocutor between
play  and  audience  but  in  a  far  more  richly  evolved  way;  consistently  seeking  out
common ground (sensus communis) with the audience of the most unprincipled and
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degraded sort.  Notwithstanding his  “honesty”,  his  watchword, “I am not what I  am”
(1.1.65), invokes the Theatrum Mundi. Yet Iago is plainly himself as interlocutor. This is
what makes him so frightening. As himself – bearing the mark of Cain, as Guazzo might
say – he seduces the audience no less than he seduces Othello. The audience becomes
complicit with Iago just by listening to him, by finding him entertaining. The audience
is  sucked  into  his  conversational  world  no less  than  Isabella  is  sucked  into  that  of
Vienna. Iago’s conversation achieves its end simply by happening, by dominating, by
not being stopped. If the audience is romanced into sympathizing with Othello against
Brabantio,  Iago’s  racist  jokes remind them of  their  underlying sens commun.  These
jokes are funny because they are wickedly scapegoating, not in spite of it. Iago’s humour
works in the way that Thomas Hobbes explained laughter: as a mode of victimization
(“laughter  is  a  sudden glory”).55  Equally  they work in  the  way that  Eddie  Waters  –
teacher of stand-up comedy in Trevor Griffith’s 1975 play Comedians  – explains the
logic of racist and misogynist humour, as pandering to the audience’s prejudices. The
comedian invites the audience into the prejudice,  and establishes it as their point of
contact. There is, insists Waters, another kind of humour that does not victimize, that
raises the audience’s gaze rather than lowering it. But that requires talent, imagination
and moral ambition.
One is tempted to think that while sensus communis can be elevated in the way that
Juvenal  and  Montaigne  thought,  its  first  instinct  is  for  the  depraved  solidarities  of
racism and sexism by which a given group effortlessly glorifies itself at the expense of
scapegoats.  As  with  Shylock  Iago’s  interlocutor-function  prefigures  that  of  the
raisonneurs of later seventeenth century comedy (Molière’s in particular).56 Not unike
such figures (Cléante from Tartuffe,  Philinte from Le Misanthrope) Iago occupies an
intermediate  position  as  interlocutor  and actively  promotes  a  “rational”  perspective.
The difference is that his ratio is consistently keyed to a sensus communis of prejudice
and group malice. While Guazzo entertains the possibility of civil conversation being
infiltrated  by  wickedness,  he  never  quite  entertains  the  possibility  of  its  wholesale
corruption by hate speech; partly because he views conversation in civil terms, or from
the position of the decent citizen seriously exercised by the problem of safeguarding his
decency.
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This is precisely why Iago is so undermining. He commands the entire conversation
of the play that is not Othello’s. He is a far more theatrically potent figure than any of
the raisonneurs of Molière, and arguably more so than Othello himself.57 Iago’s potency
is  an  equal  symbiosis  of  verbal  brilliance  with  malice,  allowing  him  to  highjack
conversation for “common” ends and worse. To the extent that Othello is a conversation
with the audience or reader, they or we are in no position to condemn Othello for having
been corrupted by Iago. It is they/we who are compromised and entertained in one. We
may justify the attention we pay to this magnetic figure by condemning him as a villain.
But as Montaigne has reminded us, we can be in two contradictory frames of mind at
the same time (“whosoever studies himself really attentively finds in himself […] this
discord”  58).  We  are  not  what  we  are.  We  abhor  the  vileness  yet  savour  the  deft
alliteration of “coursers for cousins and jennets for germans” (1.1.116).  But style and
content are not so neatly disentangled, our covenants with Iago’s language not so easily
dissolved. Much of what Iago says is interlocutory, beyond the moral economy of the
spectacle: “And what’s he then that says I play the villain? / When this advice is free I
give and honest, / Probal to thinking […]?” (2.3.327-29). Iago’s deeper evil is in thought,
and thoughts as John Angell wrote, “are free from punishment by the Laws of men”;
they “passe in the minde as currently as water in the livelyest fountain; it is not like a
watch in thy pocket, which will not run without winding up”.59 The only check on the
infiltrative quality of thought, in Angell’s view is “the right ordering of conversation”.60
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Conclusion
But Iago’s conversation with the audience is degrading. He seems to signal as much in
his final challenge: “Demand me nothing. What you know, you know” (5.2.309).
Who is “you”? In the first instance it is Othello, but the word spills out to embrace
everyone, fictional or real, who has seen what has happened and heard what has been
said.  Repetition of  the  second person pronoun means you know who you are.  The
audience, moreover, knows more than the characters know because it has been privy to
Iago’s  thinking.  Surely  they  /  you /  we,  are  all  intended here.  The  words  aimed at
Othello  call  in  question the demoralizing experience of  which Othello’s  tragedy is  a
mimesis: it is the experience of our own conversation with Iago.
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What  is  it  that  we  “know”?  Repetition of  this  biblically  loaded verb  invites  over-
determination, as in Eliot’s question, “after such knowledge, what forgiveness?” Since F.
R.  Leavis,  discussions  of  Othello  have tended to  turn on the  question  of  the  hero’s
culpability.61 But this question is turned back upon “us”, and the fragility of our own
goodness.62 What I think we “know” is something of the nastiness of the fun we have
had  in  Iago’s  conversation  and  the  fun  of  that  nastiness;  complicity  in  the  victim-
seeking jokes, the gulling of a race, the exhilaration of charivari.63 If sensus communis
is a shared experience, it can also be a tainting one. Othello understands itself as a play
about race hatred in a way that Merchant of Venice does not. Hence, where the Jew-
baiters  of  the  Merchant  represent  the  Venetian  norm,  race-hatred  in  Othello  is
concentrated in an overtly evil figure who then disseminates it to the audience in the
guise of their own “common sense”.  The difference between the two plays is that in
Othello we are that much further along Jameson’s aporetic “thinking of the path”. Iago
then embodies a degraded sensus communis rather than the proleptically enlightened
kind proposed by Montaigne. If we are infected however, we are intensely unsettled,
morally shamed, and this is perhaps a step on the road to a better solidarity.
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I have tried to show that all four competing models of conversation in English and
European early modernity are entertained by Shakespeare, and that their competition
plays itself out in his drama just as it does in the culture of the period. Even the barely
emergent  sense  of  conversation  as  dialectic  (clearly  visible  only  in  Montaigne)  is
recognizably there. I have also tried to suggest that the competition between opposing
notions of conversation gives rise to some of the most haunting and unsettling moments
in Shakespeare.
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But  I  want  to  suggest  something  more  too.  This  is  that  while  the  historical
competition  has  up  until  very  recently  been  seen  as  having  had  “winners”  –  “civil
conversation”  prevailing  over  “holy  conversation”;  conversation  in  the  sense  of
“interchange  of  words  and  thoughts”  prevailing  over  conversation  as  an  existential
milieu; conversation in the sense of dialectic prevailing over conversation as ornament
(Milton’s “nice and subtle happiness”) – the wins have been less conclusive than we
might have imagined. In the last few years, on both sides of the Anglophone Atlantic,
progressive politics has proved surprisingly vulnerable to a seemingly new but in fact
very old kind of  conversation. Reason has become the slave of identity politics.  The
sensus communis has been penetrated by extreme forms of racism and xenophobia. The
verbal  and rational  content  of  these  conversations  is  of  far  less  moment  than their
powers  of  auto-confirmation.  Political  conversations  have  tended  to  close  in  upon
themselves in an unholy parody of St. Paul. Evidence is ceasing to matter, alternative
facts can always be found. Aversation on the one hand and preaching to the converted
on the other are back. While we cannot continue this discussion in a paper of this scope,
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California  Press,  1971,  p.  155).  Rosenberg  also  tells:  “a  fine  story  about  a  prominent  British
Othello  of  this  [ie.  last]  century  who  took  an  acting  company  into  the  provinces  –  a  good
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booking took a rather less competent Iago. This substitute also proved a villain and drew the best
notices,  and  again  the  injured Moor  rid  himself  of  his  crafty  Ancient.  For  the  next  stop,  he
protected himself by giving the Iago role to an untried stage hand. This time, when the reviews
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